← How APRF works

v0.11.0 · working-draft

APRF Threat Intelligence Map

Why does each APRF control exist, and what does it defend against?

Not certification

Informative threat context only. Threat and MITRE mappings explain the security rationale behind a control; they are not certification, not a guarantee of mitigation, and not a substitute for the control's evidence requirements. A mapping means "this control reduces exposure to this technique", not "this control fully prevents this technique".

Checks
178
Threats
29
ATLAS
79
ATT&CK
27

Browse by threat

Closed vocabulary from the threat map. Each threat lists Checks that reduce exposure to it.

Browse by MITRE technique

ATLAS and ATT&CK technique IDs linked from Checks. Empty ATT&CK/ATLAS on a Check means the control is governance/assurance-oriented.

Browse by Check

Full index of Checks with security intent and threat chips.

  • Ensure every production agent has an approved, documented operating boundary so no agent runs unaccounted for.

    Shadow AgentsExcessive AgencyUnauthorized Tool Use
  • Prevent autonomous agents from executing beyond approved operational limits.

    Excessive AgencyDenial of WalletTool AbuseDenial of Service
  • Give operators a reliable means to halt agent execution when it behaves unsafely or is under attack.

    Agent HijackingExcessive AgencyTool AbuseDenial of Wallet
  • Ensure agent-to-agent handoffs authenticate the peer and carry only scoped, least-privilege capabilities.

    Identity SpoofingAgent HijackingPrivilege EscalationUnauthorized Tool Use
  • Detect conflicting or policy-violating agent goals before a plan is allowed to execute.

    Excessive AgencyHallucinated ActionsPrompt Injection
  • Validate new agent behaviour in an isolated environment before it can act on production systems.

    Excessive AgencyUnsafe Code ExecutionHallucinated ActionsTool Abuse
  • Establish accountable ownership for every production agent across the teams that operate it.

    Shadow AgentsExcessive Agency
  • Ensure no production AI endpoint serves an unauthenticated caller.

    Identity SpoofingDenial of WalletModel TheftData Exfiltration
  • Ensure every service-to-service and MCP connection proves a strong machine identity rather than a shared static secret.

    Identity SpoofingPrivilege EscalationUnauthorized Tool UseSupply Chain Compromise
  • Prevent takeover of AI control planes through compromised administrator credentials.

    Identity SpoofingPrivilege EscalationInsider MisuseSupply Chain Compromise
  • Preserve the end user's identity through agent and tool hops so downstream authorization is evaluated against the real principal.

    Privilege EscalationIdentity SpoofingUnauthorized Tool UseData Exfiltration
  • Limit the useful lifetime of agent and tool credentials so leaked material expires quickly.

    Secret LeakageIdentity SpoofingPrivilege EscalationData Exfiltration
  • Ensure self-hosted inference runtimes authenticate as attested workloads rather than with embedded static secrets.

    Identity SpoofingSecret LeakagePrivilege Escalation
  • Ensure every AI feature, tool call, and retrieval is authorized server-side and never by model output alone.

    Privilege EscalationUnauthorized Tool UseData ExfiltrationPrompt InjectionExcessive Agency
  • Prevent one tenant's data, memory, or retrieval context from reaching another tenant.

    Unauthorized Memory AccessData ExfiltrationSensitive Information DisclosurePrivilege Escalation
  • Constrain what an agent identity is permitted to do so that a compromised agent has limited reach.

    Privilege EscalationExcessive AgencyAgent HijackingData ExfiltrationTool Abuse
  • Enforce attribute-based restrictions so sensitive document classes cannot enter retrieval or context without authorization.

    Data ExfiltrationSensitive Information DisclosureUnauthorized Memory AccessPrompt Injection
  • Express tool and model access rules as reviewable, testable code rather than ad hoc configuration.

    Privilege EscalationUnauthorized Tool UseExcessive AgencyConfiguration Drift
  • Detect and remove privilege that high-privilege agent identities accumulate over time.

    Privilege EscalationExcessive AgencyInsider MisuseShadow Agents
  • Guarantee that a known-good prompt and model state can be restored after a harmful or compromised change.

    Configuration DriftData and Model PoisoningDenial of ServiceRepudiation
  • Ensure the responder on shift can actually reverse a harmful AI change under incident conditions.

    Denial of ServiceHarmful Content GenerationConfiguration Drift
  • Verify that the rollback capability actually works before it is needed in an incident.

    Denial of ServiceConfiguration Drift
  • Reduce time-to-recovery by making rollback a single low-error operation.

    Denial of ServiceHarmful Content GenerationConfiguration Drift
  • Allow new agent behaviour to be disabled instantly without a redeploy.

    Excessive AgencyTool AbuseHarmful Content GenerationDenial of Wallet
  • Automatically revert AI releases that degrade quality or safety beyond agreed thresholds.

    Harmful Content GenerationMisinformationDenial of Service
  • Ensure the legal and regulatory obligations that apply to production AI are identified and owned.

    RepudiationInsider Misuse
  • Tie each in-scope AI obligation to the concrete evidence artifact that demonstrates it.

    Repudiation
  • Preserve an immutable record of AI control-plane changes for detection and investigation.

    RepudiationInsider MisusePrivilege Escalation
  • Test controls on a cadence and record the exceptions that testing reveals.

    RepudiationConfiguration Drift
  • Give customers an accurate, published account of the AI controls in place.

    Repudiation
  • Obtain independent verification of control effectiveness for the highest-capability systems.

    RepudiationInsider Misuse
  • Cap the financial and capacity impact of abusive or runaway AI usage.

    Denial of WalletDenial of ServiceExcessive Agency
  • Detect abnormal AI spend early enough to intervene.

    Denial of WalletDenial of Service
  • Prevent retry and loop logic from amplifying a single request into unbounded cost.

    Denial of WalletDenial of ServiceExcessive Agency
  • Reduce the cost and capacity impact of repeated identical requests.

    Denial of WalletDenial of Service
  • Reduce unit cost without silently degrading quality on low-risk tasks.

    Denial of WalletMisinformation
  • Keep AI unit economics under periodic review so structural cost drift is caught.

    Denial of Wallet
  • Bound context assembly so oversized or attacker-padded input cannot displace instructions or exhaust resources.

    Prompt InjectionDenial of ServiceDenial of Wallet
  • Ensure content entering the context is attributed to a source and authorized for the requesting principal.

    Prompt InjectionData ExfiltrationUnauthorized Memory AccessSensitive Information Disclosure
  • Prevent secrets and regulated data from entering model context without an explicit approved policy.

    Secret LeakageSensitive Information DisclosureData Exfiltration
  • Detect context saturation that degrades answer quality or signals abuse.

    Denial of ServiceDenial of WalletPrompt Injection
  • Ensure compaction and summarization do not silently discard facts that decisions depend on.

    MisinformationHallucinated Actions
  • Make untrusted content structurally distinguishable from system instructions.

    Prompt InjectionAgent Hijacking
  • Ensure prompts, models, and tools reach production only through a reviewed promotion path.

    Supply Chain CompromiseConfiguration DriftData and Model PoisoningInsider Misuse
  • Maintain an attributable record of every production AI artifact change.

    RepudiationInsider MisuseConfiguration DriftSupply Chain Compromise
  • Make AI infrastructure and configuration reviewable and reproducible rather than manually mutated.

    Configuration DriftPrivilege EscalationInsider Misuse
  • Limit the population exposed to a new AI change until it is proven healthy.

    Harmful Content GenerationMisinformationDenial of Service
  • Ensure the models and tools validated in test are the ones actually serving production traffic.

    Configuration DriftSupply Chain CompromiseUnauthorized Tool Use
  • Prevent inconsistent or partially migrated retrieval indexes from serving production traffic.

    Vector and Embedding WeaknessesMisinformationDenial of Service
  • Establish accountable ownership and version control over the corpora that ground production answers.

    Data and Model PoisoningMemory PoisoningMisinformation
  • Ensure data used for evaluation and fine-tuning comes from known, vetted sources.

    Data and Model PoisoningSupply Chain CompromiseMisinformation
  • Prevent unvetted feedback or memory from being promoted into content that shapes future answers.

    Memory PoisoningData and Model PoisoningMisinformation
  • Detect stale or incomplete corpora before they degrade grounded answers.

    MisinformationData and Model Poisoning
  • Detect divergence between offline and online pipelines that silently degrades results.

    Vector and Embedding WeaknessesMisinformationConfiguration Drift
  • Document dataset purpose, source, and PII handling so downstream reuse is an informed decision.

    Data and Model PoisoningSensitive Information Disclosure
  • Make the controlled route to production the easiest route, so teams do not build around it.

    Configuration DriftShadow AgentsInsider Misuse
  • Let builders detect control failures before merge rather than at release.

    Secret LeakageIdentity SpoofingConfiguration Drift
  • Make safe configuration the starting point for new agent, RAG, and MCP services.

    Configuration DriftPrompt InjectionSecret Leakage
  • Let builders run evaluations before opening a pull request.

    MisinformationHallucinated Actions
  • Measure whether the paved road is actually being used.

    Configuration DriftShadow Agents
  • Give the AI platform a named owner and a support channel so problems have somewhere to go.

    Shadow Agents
  • Detect quality and safety regressions in critical journeys before they reach users.

    MisinformationHallucinated ActionsHarmful Content Generation
  • Ensure releases cannot proceed when quality or safety metrics fall below agreed minimums.

    MisinformationHarmful Content GenerationHallucinated Actions
  • Observe real production outcomes, including safety refusals, rather than relying on pre-release testing alone.

    Harmful Content GenerationJailbreakPrompt InjectionMisinformation
  • Compare a candidate AI change against production behaviour before it serves users.

    MisinformationHarmful Content GenerationDenial of Service
  • Ensure adversarial robustness is measured on its own and not averaged away by aggregate quality scores.

    Prompt InjectionJailbreakMisinformation
  • Apply human judgement to outputs on a cadence, where automated metrics cannot recognize the harm.

    MisinformationHarmful Content GenerationBias and Discrimination
  • Ensure grounded answers carry verifiable source attribution so claims can be checked.

    MisinformationHallucinated ActionsPrompt Injection
  • Make it possible to reconstruct how a specific production AI outcome was reached.

    RepudiationPrompt InjectionHallucinated Actions
  • Prevent explanation and rationale surfaces from becoming a disclosure channel.

    Sensitive Information DisclosureSystem Prompt LeakageSecret LeakageData Exfiltration
  • Give users an intelligible reason for material automated decisions that affect them.

    RepudiationBias and DiscriminationMisinformation
  • Map formal explainability obligations to the regulated features they apply to.

    RepudiationBias and Discrimination
  • Make the behavioural effect of a model or prompt change reviewable rather than inferred.

    Configuration DriftMisinformation
  • Require a human decision before an AI system performs a high-impact or irreversible action.

    Excessive AgencyHallucinated ActionsPrompt InjectionAgent HijackingTool Abuse
  • Record who approved each high-impact AI action, on what evidence, and with what outcome.

    RepudiationInsider MisuseExcessive Agency
  • Ensure no alternate agent, API, or tool path can perform a gated action without approval.

    Privilege EscalationExcessive AgencyUnauthorized Tool UseTool Abuse
  • Require two independent human authorizations before irreversible high-severity actions.

    Insider MisuseExcessive AgencyHallucinated ActionsAgent Hijacking
  • Give approvers the context needed to make approval a real decision rather than a reflex.

    Excessive AgencyHallucinated ActionsPrompt InjectionTool Abuse
  • Keep approval queues fast enough that teams do not route around the gate.

    Excessive AgencyInsider Misuse
  • Ensure responders have prepared procedures for AI-specific incident classes.

    Prompt InjectionData ExfiltrationHarmful Content GenerationAgent HijackingDenial of Service
  • Ensure on-call responders can actually stop AI activity during an incident.

    Agent HijackingExcessive AgencyTool AbuseData ExfiltrationDenial of Wallet
  • Page responders on safety and quality signals, not only on infrastructure health.

    Harmful Content GenerationJailbreakMisinformation
  • Convert incident learning into owned, tracked control improvements.

    Repudiation
  • Define in advance when an AI-related event requires customer notification.

    RepudiationSensitive Information Disclosure
  • Rehearse AI-specific incident response before a real event tests it.

    Prompt InjectionData ExfiltrationAgent Hijacking
  • Eliminate unauthenticated public exposure of AI data stores and control planes.

    Data ExfiltrationSensitive Information DisclosurePrivilege EscalationModel Theft
  • Bound the exposure window for known vulnerabilities in AI runtime environments.

    Privilege EscalationUnsafe Code ExecutionSupply Chain Compromise
  • Restrict outbound reachability from agent and tool runtimes to an approved set of destinations.

    Data ExfiltrationAgent HijackingTool AbuseSupply Chain Compromise
  • Prevent one tenant on shared AI accelerators from reading or starving another.

    Data ExfiltrationUnauthorized Memory AccessDenial of Service
  • Ensure only cryptographically verified AI artifacts are allowed to run in production.

    Supply Chain CompromiseData and Model PoisoningUnsafe Code Execution
  • Catch insecure infrastructure defaults before they are deployed.

    Configuration DriftPrivilege EscalationData Exfiltration
  • Prevent AI memory from being read or influenced across tenant and user boundaries.

    Unauthorized Memory AccessData ExfiltrationMemory PoisoningSensitive Information Disclosure
  • Ensure AI memory is retained only as long as policy allows and can actually be deleted.

    Sensitive Information DisclosureUnauthorized Memory AccessRepudiation
  • Ensure only authorized principals and validated content can write to durable AI memory.

    Memory PoisoningData and Model PoisoningPrompt InjectionMisinformation
  • Make tampering with critical memory records detectable.

    Memory PoisoningUnauthorized Memory AccessRepudiation
  • Verify that memory write and retrieval controls actually resist poisoning attempts.

    Memory PoisoningPrompt InjectionMisinformation
  • Prevent transient session content from becoming durable knowledge without an explicit promotion decision.

    Memory PoisoningUnauthorized Memory AccessMisinformation
  • Ensure production behaviour comes from an explicitly chosen, evaluated model version.

    Supply Chain CompromiseConfiguration DriftMisinformation
  • Require evaluation evidence before any model change is promoted to production.

    MisinformationHarmful Content GenerationData and Model Poisoning
  • Manage model and embedding deprecation before a provider withdrawal forces it.

    Configuration DriftDenial of Service
  • Grant each workload only the model capabilities it actually needs.

    Unsafe Code ExecutionExcessive AgencyPrompt InjectionTool Abuse
  • Review the license and provenance of open-weight and fine-tuned models before adoption.

    Supply Chain CompromiseData and Model Poisoning
  • Maintain an accurate inventory of the models running in production and their intended use.

    Shadow AgentsConfiguration DriftSensitive Information Disclosure
  • Make the full AI execution path observable end to end for detection and investigation.

    RepudiationPrompt InjectionTool AbuseData Exfiltration
  • Prevent observability pipelines from becoming a secondary store of sensitive data.

    Secret LeakageSensitive Information DisclosureData Exfiltration
  • Enable safe reproduction of failed AI interactions without exposing production data.

    Sensitive Information DisclosurePrompt Injection
  • Turn observed production failures into evaluation cases.

    MisinformationHallucinated Actions
  • Present AI latency, error, and quality burn against SLOs in one place.

    Denial of ServiceMisinformation
  • Attribute AI consumption precisely enough to detect abuse and runaway usage.

    Denial of WalletExcessive Agency
  • Establish the organization's binding boundary for acceptable and prohibited AI use.

    Insider MisuseHarmful Content GenerationShadow Agents
  • Keep AI risk posture visible to the leadership that can fund and mandate remediation.

    Shadow Agents
  • Assign named owners to the APRF domains that matter for each production AI system.

    Shadow AgentsRepudiation
  • Feed incidents and evaluation failures into a tracked improvement backlog.

    Repudiation
  • Record accepted control gaps with an owner and an expiry rather than leaving them implicit.

    RepudiationInsider Misuse
  • Independently sample APRF evidence to confirm that claimed controls are real.

    RepudiationInsider Misuse
  • Define the availability and latency commitment for critical AI user journeys.

    Denial of Service
  • Expose latency, error, and AI quality metrics so degradation is measurable.

    Denial of ServiceMisinformation
  • Alert when SLO burn indicates the system is degrading beyond agreed limits.

    Denial of ServiceDenial of Wallet
  • Use error budgets to slow release velocity when AI reliability is degrading.

    Denial of Service
  • Validate that the system withstands deliberately expensive prompts and agent loops.

    Denial of ServiceDenial of WalletExcessive Agency
  • Measure streaming-specific latency so perceived responsiveness is not invisible to SLOs.

    Denial of Service
  • Present AI operational metrics in near real time so degradation is seen as it happens.

    Denial of Service
  • Know which data classes reach models so sensitive classes can be handled under explicit rules.

    Sensitive Information DisclosureData ExfiltrationSecret Leakage
  • Ensure data subject deletion and export actually reach AI memory, traces, and logs.

    Sensitive Information DisclosureUnauthorized Memory AccessRepudiation
  • Prevent regulated workloads from being processed outside their permitted jurisdiction.

    Sensitive Information DisclosureData Exfiltration
  • Remove or tokenize high-sensitivity fields before they reach a model.

    Sensitive Information DisclosureData ExfiltrationSecret Leakage
  • Ensure third-party model provider terms do not permit training on or over-retaining production data.

    Sensitive Information Disclosure
  • Assess privacy and rights impact before a major AI feature reaches production.

    Sensitive Information DisclosureBias and Discrimination
  • Make the exact prompt serving production identifiable, attributable, and immutable.

    Configuration DriftRepudiationPrompt Injection
  • Ensure prompt changes are reviewed and backed by evaluation evidence before release.

    Harmful Content GenerationPrompt InjectionMisinformationInsider Misuse
  • Allow rollback to a prior prompt version without redeploying unrelated services.

    Harmful Content GenerationDenial of ServiceConfiguration Drift
  • Keep secrets and personal data out of prompt source and templates.

    Secret LeakageSystem Prompt LeakageSensitive Information DisclosurePrompt Injection
  • Catch injection-prone and unsafe prompt constructs before they reach production.

    Prompt InjectionSecret LeakageSystem Prompt Leakage
  • Measure the real impact of high-traffic prompt changes before full rollout.

    Harmful Content GenerationMisinformation
  • Prevent a slow or failing dependency from exhausting capacity or amplifying cost.

    Denial of ServiceDenial of WalletExcessive Agency
  • Keep critical user journeys functional when the AI path is unavailable.

    Denial of Service
  • Prevent tool-using workflows from reporting success when steps have silently failed.

    Hallucinated ActionsMisinformationExcessive Agency
  • Ensure the artifacts required to restore AI service survive a destructive event.

    Denial of ServiceData and Model PoisoningSupply Chain Compromise
  • Set explicit recovery time and recovery point objectives for business-critical AI services.

    Denial of Service
  • Stop a failing AI provider from cascading into total service failure.

    Denial of Service
  • Remove single-provider dependency for critical AI journeys without lowering the quality bar.

    Denial of Service
  • Document how critical AI-dependent business processes continue when AI is unavailable.

    Denial of Service
  • Rehearse continuity, including full provider loss, before it is tested by a real outage.

    Denial of Service
  • Deliberately exercise AI dependency failure modes in production-like conditions.

    Denial of Service
  • Keep standby inference capacity ready where self-hosted models are business-critical.

    Denial of Service
  • Back multi-provider continuity with contractual commitments, not just technical routing.

    Denial of ServiceSupply Chain Compromise
  • Define what constitutes unsafe output and behaviour for this specific product domain.

    Harmful Content GenerationMisinformationBias and Discrimination
  • Block releases that fail the organization's stated safety bar.

    Harmful Content GenerationJailbreakMisinformationBias and Discrimination
  • Ensure users know when they are interacting with an AI system.

    MisinformationIdentity Spoofing
  • Measure disparate outcomes on high-stakes automated decision paths.

    Bias and DiscriminationHarmful Content Generation
  • Apply human judgement to safety edge cases that automated evaluation classifies poorly.

    Harmful Content GenerationBias and DiscriminationMisinformation
  • Test whether safety controls hold end to end, from jailbreak attempt through to real-world harm.

    JailbreakHarmful Content GenerationPrompt Injection
  • Ensure production AI artifacts come from a verified source and have not been tampered with.

    Supply Chain CompromiseData and Model PoisoningUnsafe Code Execution
  • Ensure every external tool, MCP server, and plugin in production is known, pinned, and reviewed.

    Supply Chain CompromiseTool AbuseUnauthorized Tool UsePrompt Injection
  • Block deployment of AI artifacts carrying known exploitable vulnerabilities.

    Supply Chain CompromiseUnsafe Code ExecutionPrivilege Escalation
  • Enforce at the deployment boundary that only approved, signed AI artifacts can run.

    Supply Chain CompromiseData and Model PoisoningInsider Misuse
  • Verify artifact signatures against build provenance at deploy time.

    Supply Chain CompromiseData and Model Poisoning
  • Record the composition of each production model pin so affected deployments can be found quickly.

    Supply Chain CompromiseData and Model Poisoning
  • Prevent untrusted model input from being treated as an authorization decision for privileged actions.

    Prompt InjectionPrivilege EscalationExcessive AgencyUnauthorized Tool Use
  • Ensure model output cannot cause side effects until it has been validated against an explicit schema or policy.

    Prompt InjectionUnsafe Code ExecutionHallucinated ActionsTool AbuseHarmful Content Generation
  • Prevent releases that regress the system's resistance to jailbreak, abuse, and injection.

    Prompt InjectionJailbreakHarmful Content GenerationData Exfiltration
  • Prevent the model and agent path from becoming an unrestricted proxy into internal systems and networks.

    Data ExfiltrationPrivilege EscalationPrompt InjectionTool Abuse
  • Validate defences against multi-turn and retrieval-borne indirect prompt injection.

    Prompt InjectionMemory PoisoningData ExfiltrationTool Abuse
  • Prevent malicious or unsafe multimodal payloads from reaching the model or downstream systems.

    Prompt InjectionHarmful Content GenerationUnsafe Code ExecutionSupply Chain Compromise
  • Detect attempts to exfiltrate sensitive data through AI request and response paths.

    Data ExfiltrationSensitive Information DisclosureSecret LeakagePrompt Injection
  • Keep production secrets out of prompts, source control, and notebooks.

    Secret LeakagePrivilege EscalationIdentity SpoofingData Exfiltration
  • Prevent secrets from being persisted into logs and traces.

    Secret LeakageSensitive Information DisclosurePrivilege Escalation
  • Ensure AI credentials are narrowly scoped, rotatable, and never shipped to clients.

    Secret LeakageDenial of WalletPrivilege EscalationIdentity Spoofing
  • Detect committed secrets before they reach a shared repository.

    Secret LeakageSupply Chain Compromise
  • Constrain where a leaked runtime credential can actually be used from.

    Secret LeakageData ExfiltrationPrivilege Escalation
  • Prevent secrets and sensitive data from being baked into models or published corpora.

    Secret LeakageSensitive Information DisclosureData and Model Poisoning
  • Ensure tool execution authority comes from server-side policy, never from model output.

    Prompt InjectionUnauthorized Tool UsePrivilege EscalationExcessive AgencyTool Abuse
  • Restrict each agent to a fixed, approved set of tools it cannot expand at runtime.

    Unauthorized Tool UseTool AbuseExcessive AgencySupply Chain Compromise
  • Require an additional gate before high-impact tools are permitted to execute.

    Excessive AgencyTool AbuseHallucinated ActionsPrompt Injection
  • Prevent unvalidated model-generated arguments from reaching an executor.

    Unsafe Code ExecutionPrompt InjectionTool AbusePrivilege Escalation
  • Ensure tool catalog definitions are authentic and unchanged since they were reviewed.

    Supply Chain CompromisePrompt InjectionTool AbuseUnauthorized Tool Use
  • Let destructive tool behaviour be validated without producing irreversible effects.

    Excessive AgencyHallucinated ActionsTool Abuse
  • Bound how much damage a single agent or tool can do within a given window.

    Tool AbuseExcessive AgencyData ExfiltrationDenial of WalletDenial of Service

Sources

Machine-readable: /aprf/threat-map.json. Normative Checks remain in /aprf/spec/.